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How “Political” is Quong’s Political Liberalism?
Abstract  In this short paper I ask to what extent the sharp contrast betwe-
en the political and the comprehensive, on which political liberals such as 
Rawls and Quong place primary emphasis, caters to a truly “political” con-
ception of liberalism. I argue that Quong’s own take on this point is more 
distinctively “political” than Rawls’s, in that it assigns far less weight to ci-
tizens’ comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, I suggest that Quong’s exclusion 
of comprehensive doctrines (exemplified by his worries about an “overlap-
ping consensus”) has more radical implications than Quong himself seems 
to think. In doing so, I offer a streamlined version of Quong’s critique, which 
encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls’s doctrine of the 
overlapping consensus. I will call them the “sincerity objection” and the “li-
beral objection”. 
Keywords:  Comprehensive Doctrines; Overlapping Consensus; Political Li-
beralism; Public Reason; Rawls
1. Introduction
Political Liberalism, as Rawls and Rawlsians in general understand it, 
hinges upon the crucial distinction between the political and the com­
prehensive.  Very  roughly,  and  despite  the  diversity  of  their  specific 
views, political liberals suggest focusing primarily on the shared “politi­
cal” ideas that are latent in liberal democracies, and to construct prin­
ciples of political association out of those ideas. Leaving aside the is­
sue of whether it is possible to draw a clear line between “political” and 
“comprehensive” ideas,1 an important question is how far political lib­
eralism should go in expunging comprehensive doctrines from the con­
struction of political principles. This question is spurred by Rawls’s own 
worries about a purely “political” conception of liberalism, which, as 
such, would eschew all appeals to citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. 
For Rawls, the problem is that a liberal conception worked out exclu­
sively from shared political values might be not only unstable, but also 
not “fully justified” (Rawls 2005: 386).2 To achieve stability and full jus­
tification, so Rawls’s thesis, such a conception should also be the focus 
of an “overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines” 
1   This line of criticism has been pursued by Gaus 2003: 177-204 and Habermas 1995. 
2   Stability and full justification are actually two very different desiderata, as I stress 
elsewhere. Cf. Zoffoli 2012. HOw “POlITIcal” Is QUOng’s POlITIcal lIbEralIsm? ENRICO ZOFFOLI
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(Rawls 2005: 134). In short, Rawls’s own conception is only partially po­
litical, so to speak, as it makes the acceptability of a political conception 
dependent upon the assent of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
In his masterful overview of liberal conceptions, Jonathan Quong re­
jects Rawls’s suggestion, arguing from different angles that political 
liberals should be wary of letting comprehensive doctrines shape the 
structure of the political conception. In short, Quong suggests taking 
a stance toward the justification of liberalism that is more distinctively 
political than Rawls’s. In this paper I do not mean to challenge Quong’s 
elegant arguments, but only to invite those who are impressed by them 
to think more carefully about their implications, which I think are more 
radical than Quong himself seems to think. In doing so, I will also of­
fer a streamlined version of Quong’s critique, which encompasses two 
more or less direct criticisms of Rawls’s doctrine of the overlapping con­
sensus. I will call them the “sincerity objection” (§2) and the “liberal ob­
jection” (§3), respectively. 
2. Quong’s sincerity objection
Instead  of  attacking  the  idea  of  an  overlapping  consensus  directly, 
Quong’s sincerity objection raises serious worries about the impact that 
an overlapping consensus would have on public reason. 
Rawls is explicit that overlapping consensus and public reason have two 
different subjects: while the former is meant to support a political con­
ception in its entirety, the latter kicks in when it comes to assessing the 
permissibility of certain laws and policies within a liberal constitution­
al framework. Still, as Quong himself notes, the overlapping consen­
sus does risk affecting the pool of reasons that citizens can legitimately 
draw upon when reasoning publicly with one another. Suppose, for in­
stance, that Andy accepts liberalism mainly because it is consistent with 
his utilitarian doctrine. In this case, an overlapping consensus (encom­
passing Andy’s utilitarian doctrine) would be crucial to gaining Andy’s 
reasoned assent. Most probably, though, Andy’s utilitarian reasons for 
accepting liberalism will resurface whenever Andy is asked to assess the 
legitimacy of specific laws and policies. Because he accepts liberalism on 
utilitarian grounds, Andy will probably withdraw his assent from laws 
and policies that turn out to be inconsistent with his utilitarian convic­
tions. Conversely, and for pretty much the same reason, he will probably 
demand a utilitarian justification for the laws he should be subjected to. lIbEralIsm wITHOUT PErFEcTIOn
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The issue, however, is that by advocating his sheer comprehensive views 
in public political advocacy, Andy would end up defying the ideal of 
public reason as Rawls understands it, since according to Rawls public 
reason requires reliance on shared “political” values, or at the very least 
the sincere willingness to offer proper political reasons “in due course” 
(Rawls 1999: 590-91). Some advocates of the overlapping consensus ac­
cept this implication, indeed wholeheartedly so, arguing that public 
reason should in fact allow citizens to advocate their comprehensive 
reasons when discussing the legitimacy of collectively binding politi­
cal proposals. Call this a “convergence” view of public reason.3 Quong, 
however, rejects this view, on the grounds that it would be at odds with 
public reason’s sincerity requirement. 
Quong thinks that a requirement of this kind is necessary to ensure that 
attempts at public justification do not lapse into rhetorical manipula­
tion. Only when we are sincere with others, Quong argues, do we respect 
them as free and equal fellow citizens, as “… we acknowledge that every 
citizen is to be treated as someone … who is the source of moral claims 
… someone over whom power cannot be exercised without appropri­
ate justification” (Quong 2011: 266). More specifically, Quong endorses 
what he calls the “principle of justificatory sincerity” (hereafter: PJS):
Principle of Justificatory Sincerity (PJS): Andy can support proposal 
X only if he reasonably believes that (a) he himself is justified in en­
dorsing X, that (b) Bea is/could reasonably be justified in endorsing 
X and that (c) Bea is/could reasonably be justified in accepting the 
arguments he has offered in support of X (and vice versa for Bea’s 
proposals).4 
Quong thinks that PJS undermines the convergence view of public rea­
son, thereby providing an indirect case against Rawls’s doctrine of the 
overlapping consensus. Quong has in mind the following scenario. Sup­
pose Andy accepts a given proposal X for some comprehensive reason 
RA, while he argues that Bea has her own comprehensive reason RB to 
endorse X. In this case, Andy would put forward what Gaus calls a “con­
vergence argument”, which seeks “to show that we have different reasons 
for endorsing X, though we all have some reasons for endorsing it” (Gaus 
2003: 190-91). Rawls himself admits of this kind of reasoning, which he 
3   For a defense of the convergence view of public reason see Gaus 2011, Gaus and 
Vallier 2009, Stout 2004 and Zoffoli 2013. 
4   I have slightly simplified Quong’s original formulation of PJS. Other principles 
of sincerity, which are more or less in tune with Quong’s intuition, can be found in 
Nagel 2003: 66, Gaus 1996: 139, Schwartzman 2011, Postema 1995 and Rawls 1999: 578. HOw “POlITIcal” Is QUOng’s POlITIcal lIbEralIsm? ENRICO ZOFFOLI
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terms “reasoning from conjecture”. If we reason “from conjecture”, we 
“argue from what we believe, or conjecture, are other people’s basic doc­
trines, religious or secular, and try to show them that, despite what they 
might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception” 
(Rawls 1999: 594). However, Quong is convinced that arguments of this 
kind are a clear example of insincere justification. Consider again our 
case. By stipulation, Andy “does not believe that RB justifies X”, so how 
could he sincerely say to Bea “RB is a reason for you to accept X”? Robert 
Audi (1991: 47) makes a similar point when he asks: “Why should   others 
be moved if I am not?. . . [I]f the reason is adequate, why does it not 
move me?” It thus seems that Andy’s convergence argument falls foul 
of requirement (c) of PJS, since Andy does not think RB is a good rea­
son for Bea. Moreover, should Andy be unable to offer any further rea­
sons to Bea other than RB, he would most probably violate requirement 
(b) as well, since he could hardly think that X is justified to Bea after 
all. Quong concludes that PJS bars the use of convergence arguments in 
public reason; this, in turn, would provide an indirect case against the 
idea that the political conception should be able to gain the assent of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, for the reasons I hinted at above.
Elsewhere I examined in greater detail Quong’s sincerity objection (cf. 
Zoffoli 2013: 162–193), but here I would just like to point out that, even 
if it were sound, such an objection would not fully undermine the role 
of comprehensive views within political liberalism. To see why, we must 
note a peculiar feature of PJS, namely, that this principle of sincerity is 
addressed exclusively to those who propose or support coercive laws. 
Like most public reason liberals, Quong is concerned primarily with 
the (sincere) justification of coercion – i.e., with the justification of laws 
that limit citizens’ freedom by means of legal sanctions. This is prob­
ably the reason why Quong’s formulation makes it explicit that PJS ap­
plies only to those proposing pieces of coercive legislation, and not to 
those opposing coercion. 
The upshot is straightforward. Although PJS would, if Quong is right, 
bar citizens from justifying or accepting coercion on sheer comprehen­
sive grounds, it would not prevent them from rejecting coercive pro­
posals by appeal to their comprehensive doctrines.5 The worry here is 
5   Although Quong repeatedly insists that PJS should lead us to reject convergence 
views altogether, sometimes he seems to admit that an independent argument is 
needed to explain why, contrary to the convergence view, comprehensive reasons 
should not be allowed to defeat coercion. See Quong 2011: 265n.lIbEralIsm wITHOUT PErFEcTIOn
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not only that citizens could reject coercive laws within public reason, 
thus defeating a number of political proposals that might be support­
ed by political values. More problematically, the issue that comprehen­
sive doctrines might enjoy a “veto right” at the deeper level of the very 
justification of the liberal conception which should be the subject of 
the overlapping consensus. The obvious worry is that some reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine could, at least in principle, refuse to endorse 
liberal principles altogether, in which case the whole Rawlsian project 
of political liberalism would either collapse, or, at the very least, be con­
stantly held captive by comprehensive doctrines.
3. Quong’s liberal objection
An obvious way of addressing this worry would be to argue that rea-
sonable comprehensive doctrines and citizens, being reasonable, would 
not reject liberalism. In other words, one could claim that being com­
mitted to liberal principles is a necessary condition for being a reason­
able citizen. Now while Quong explicitly subscribes to this claim, he 
insightfully notes that to assume a priori that reasonable citizens will 
accept liberalism is to make the idea of an overlapping consensus ulti­
mately superfluous. What is the point of the overlapping consensus if 
we already assume that such a consensus should be reached on pain of 
unreasonableness? Why seek to show that all reasonable comprehen­
sive doctrines could converge on the liberal conception if we already 
know that accepting that conception is a precondition for qualifying 
as a reasonable doctrine? In Quong’s words, advocates of the overlap­
ping consensus face an inescapable “dilemma”: “… (a) either the overlap­
ping consensus is superfluous within political liberalism … (b) or peo­
ple could reject the political conception without being unreasonable” 
(Quong 2011: 167). This dilemma constitutes what I call Quong’s liberal 
objection to Rawls’s doctrine of the overlapping consensus.
Now apparently Quong’s liberal objection aims to discard the idea of an 
overlapping consensus altogether. Because Quong insists that political 
liberals should not embrace the second horn of the dilemma, it seems 
that they should willy-nilly endorse (a). In effect, I think this is the inevi­
table upshot of Quong’s own argument: if we agree with Quong that po­
litical liberalism faces the dilemma he describes, and if we further agree 
that (b) is not a viable option, we are committed to embracing (a), thus 
recognizing that the overlapping consensus serves no relevant function 
within political liberalism. In this case, political liberalism would be HOw “POlITIcal” Is QUOng’s POlITIcal lIbEralIsm? ENRICO ZOFFOLI
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genuinely, perhaps even radically “political”, in that its whole architec­
ture would be entirely independent of citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. 
Interestingly,  however,  Quong  does  not  think  that  political  liberals 
should accept (a), and hence do away completely with the idea of an 
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In fact, 
he argues that the dilemma can be overcome, provided we deny the im­
plicit and almost universally accepted assumption that the subject of the 
overlapping consensus should be the political conception. Contrary to 
this widespread view, Quong maintains that the overlapping consen­
sus is necessary to justify the fundamental political values of freedom, 
equality and fairness, on which the construction of the freestanding jus­
tificatory procedure is based, rather than the substantive liberal princi­
ples it yields. For Quong (2011: 182), then, it is only the conception of the 
person as free and equal and the “fundamental idea of society as a fair 
system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens … which 
should be the subject of the overlapping consensus”. By shifting the focus 
of the overlapping consensus from the conception of justice to the ba­
sic political ideals of political liberalism, Quong tries to catch two birds 
with one stone: on the one hand, he wants to safeguard liberal principles 
by depriving comprehensive doctrines of the right to “veto” the politi­
cal conception; on the other hand, he seeks not to jettison the idea of an 
overlapping consensus altogether, which, in turn, allows him to let rea­
sonable comprehensive doctrines play some role in political liberalism.
I am not sure, though, whether Quong’s move accomplishes much. The 
obvious problem, I think, is that it is not clear why Quong’s novel view 
about the subject of the overlapping consensus should not be vulnera­
ble to the same objection he levels against the common view. It seems to 
me, in other words, that Quong’s view would be trapped in a strikingly 
similar dilemma: (a) either reasonable citizens accept by definition the 
fundamental ideals of freedom, equality and fairness, in which case the 
overlapping consensus will be superfluous, or (b) reasonable citizens 
can reject those ideals. Unsurprisingly, Quong discards (b), asserting 
that reasonable comprehensive doctrines are committed to those ide­
als “by definition” (Quong 2011: 182). But then we are left with (a): the 
overlapping consensus turns out to be superfluous. As Quong suggests, 
the theorist must assume that all reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
will endorse the fundamental liberal ideals by definition, and proceed 
from that basis with the construction of liberal principles (cf. Quong 
2011: 190-91). Again, though, if reasonable citizens are by definition lIbEralIsm wITHOUT PErFEcTIOn
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committed to the subject of the overlapping consensus, then it is not 
clear why such a consensus is relevant in the first place. 
I do not mean to deny that Quong’s view about the subject of the over­
lapping consensus has some merits. For instance, it can offer a fresh so­
lution to the problem we mentioned in §2, namely, that the comprehen­
sive reasons that are meant to support the political conception could end 
up playing a major role within public reason. Because Quong does not 
allow comprehensive reasons to support directly the liberal conception, 
he manages to rule out the possibility that citizens use those reasons 
within public reason, to wit, when it comes to assessing the legitimacy 
of specific laws and policies that should be consistent with the principles 
supported by an overlapping consensus. In this way, Quong’s peculiar 
doctrine of the overlapping consensus would not be open to the charge 
of letting comprehensive reasons skew the ideal of public reason (as 
Rawls understands it) – though of course Quong could still raise his sin­
cerity objection against convergence views of public reason. Still, Quong 
could drive this point home only at the price of making the overlapping 
consensus ultimately redundant, for the reasons I indicated above. 
The same line of reasoning applies to another possible advantage of 
Quong’s view, namely, that it suggests a viable solution to the well-
known problem of the moral foundations of liberalism. Political liber­
alism rests on the assumption that a just system of social cooperation 
should be justified to all its addressees understood as free and equal 
moral persons, who are committed to cooperating on fair terms. But 
what is the justification of this commitment? Why should we view oth­
ers as free and equal moral persons who deserve equal respect? The lit­
erature offers several answers: some talk of a fundamental “right to jus­
tification” (Forst 2012); others argue, in slightly different ways, that the 
commitment to justification among equals is already implicit in our eve­
ryday (communicative) practice (Habermas 1990; Gaus 2011); yet others 
draw on the idea of “humanity” (Korsgaard 1996). However, political 
liberals are wary, and reasonably so, of endorsing philosophical views of 
this kind, which would in fact consort ill with political liberalism’s com­
mitment to remain neutral on controversial issues on which reasonable 
citizens are most likely to disagree. Now one of the virtues of Quong’s 
view is precisely that it does not purport to embark on a justification 
of the fundamental values of liberalism: rather, it permits citizens to 
choose the (comprehensive) justification (if any) that they find most 
compelling. All these convergent justifications would thus constitute an HOw “POlITIcal” Is QUOng’s POlITIcal lIbEralIsm? ENRICO ZOFFOLI
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overlapping consensus on the fundamental values of liberalism, which 
Quong thinks should be the only subject of such a consensus. 
Appealing though it may be, however, this view runs up against the 
same sort of problem I have been stressing so far: in order to be part of 
the “constituency of the overlapping consensus”, as Quong often calls 
it, a citizen is committed by definition to endorsing the subject of the 
overlapping consensus. So whether or not Andy accepts the fundamen­
tal liberal values on comprehensive grounds, he is committed to en­
dorsing them by definition on pain of unreasonableness. He can, to be 
sure, find those comprehensive reasons, but the political liberal starts 
from the assumption that, for whatever reasons, the subject of the over­
lapping consensus must be accepted by all reasonable citizens. Once 
again, an overlapping consensus on the ideals of freedom, equality and 
fairness would be irrelevant, for the same reason why it would be irrel­
evant if it were meant to support the liberal conception of justice. 
4. Conclusion
Although it is primarily concerned with the importance of political val­
ues and ideals, Rawls’s political liberalism also assigns some weight to 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Specifically, Rawls’s doctrine of 
the overlapping consensus weakens the “political” character of his lib­
eralism in a twofold sense. First, it can lead, albeit indirectly, to permit 
the use of sheer comprehensive reasons within public reason. Second, 
it confers a potential “veto” right to “illiberal” comprehensive doctrines. 
In his great book, Quong seeks to avoid these implications by weak­
ening the role of the overlapping consensus, which in his view should 
cover only the fundamental elements of political liberalism, and not 
the substantive liberal conception based on those values. In this way, 
Quong defends a “more political” liberal conception, as it were, with­
out however doing away with the idea of an overlapping consensus alto­
gether. Despite its virtues, though, Quong’s solution looks hardly tena­
ble because, ironically enough, it is vulnerable to the very same problem 
that leads Quong to abandon the traditional view concerning the sub­
ject of the overlapping consensus. More precisely, I argued that Quong 
is committed by his own arguments to rejecting the very idea of a (non-
superfluous) overlapping consensus. This, in turn, commits him to en­
dorsing a more radically political conception of liberalism.
Primljeno: 2. oktobar 2013.
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Enriko Zofoli
Koliko je „politički“ Kvongov politički liberalizam?
apstrakt
U ovom kratkom eseju postavljam pitanje do koje mere oštro suprotstavlja­
nje između političkog i sveobuhvatnog, na kojemu politički liberali po­
put Rolsa i Kvonga polažu primarni naglasak, snabdeva istinski „politič­
ko“ shvatanje liberalizma. Dokazujem da je Kvongov pravac po tom pitanju 
više distinktivno „politički“ nego Rolsov, s obzirom da pridaje dosta   manju 
težinu obuhvatnim doktrinama građana. Štaviše, sugerišem da Kvongo­
vo isklju  čenje obuhvatnih doktrina (što je oprimereno njegovom brigom 
o „preklapajućem konsenzusu“) ima puno radikalnije implikacije nego što 
izgleda da sam Kvong smatra. Pri tome, nudim smer Kvongove kritike koja 
obuhvata dve više ili manje neposredne kritike Rolsovog učenja o preklapa­
jućem konsenzusu. Nazvaću ih „prigovor iskrenosti“ i „liberalni prigovor“.
Ključne reči:  Obuhvatne doktrine, preklapajući konsenzus, politički libe­
ralizam, javni um, Rawls.